This paper analyses whether the German National Socialists used economic policies to reward their voters after their rise to power in 1933. Using data on public employment in the armed forces, public administrations and related professions from the German occupational censuses in 1925, 1933 and 1939 and addressing the potential endogeneity of the National Socialist vote share in 1933 by way of an instrumental variables strategy based on a similar party in Imperial Germany 1912, I find that cities with higher National Socialist vote shares experienced a relative increase in public employment: for every additional percentage point in the vote share, the number of public employment jobs increased by around 3.5 percent. When measured relative to the total population, a one standard-deviation increase in the 1933 vote share led to an increase in the share of public employment of a quarter of a standard deviation.
Introduction
To what extent can governments use their economic means to favour their supporters or to punish their adversaries? While a large empirical literature has successfully established the economic value of political connections for rms, the evidence for voters or more aggregated units of observation is much more scarce. In this paper, I try to ll this gap by analysing whether cities benet from having voted for the right, i.e. the winning political party. In particular, the meteoric rise of the German National Socialist party in the 1930s, its seizure of power in 1933 and the subsequently enacted programmes of large-scale public investments, rearmament and expansion of the armed forces create a quasi-experimental situation that allows to identify the causal eect of a city's vote share on subsequent public investment. Between 1928 and 1933, the Nazi party grew from being one of many small and unimportant radical parties to representing the largest fraction in the parliament, making Adolf Hitler chancellor in January 1933 and, together with a coalition partner, achieving a parliamentary majority in March of the same year. In the following years, it used public investment rst as a means to achieve full employment and then to nance the massive rearmament that Hitler needed to pursue his course of territorial expansion and, nally, war. These massive public spending programmes and the extremely rapid rise of the National Socialists together create a unique possibility to estimate whether Hitler's government used its large public investment programmes in a way that favoured those cities that had helped him come to power.
On a rm-level, the value of political connections has been demonstrated convincingly by several papers. Fisman (2001) shows that rumours about the health of the Philippine dictator Suharto had a particular strong inuence on the share prices of rms that were politically connected to Suharto's regime. (2006) show that around the globe, politically connected rms are more likely to be bailed out, while Faccio (2006) nds that political connections occur particularly often both in more corrupt and in more transparent countries. Of particular relevance for this paper is the study by Ferguson and Voth (2008) , who show that rms that had (directly or through their executives) supported the German National Socialists prior to their seizure of power experienced particular high stock market returns during the rst two months of the Nazi regime: Between January and March 1933, connected rms outperformed non-connected ones by between 5 and 8%.
The potential benets of political connections for individual voters have been analysed less, particularly due to data restrictions: While political connections of rm executives and rm's donations are often public, the average voter's political aliations and convictions are most of the times neither known to the government nor to the researcher and hence cannot be analysed. One notable exception is the recent study by Hsieh et al (2011) , who document evidence that Venezuelan voters who had signed a petition calling for a referendum against Hugo Chavez subsequently were subject to drops in both earnings and employment. The pecularities of this referendum, where signers had to sign not only with their name, but were also required to provide their address and birth date, allowed Hsieh et al to identify the signers and to match them with data from the Venezuelan Household Survey. However, such detailed data on political aliations are usually not avaible.
One way out is to look at more aggregated units of observation such as cities, regions or electoral districts.
Anderson and Tollison (1991), for example, present empirical evidence that US states with inuential congressmen and senators (as measured by their tenure and their committee memberships) received more public funds during the New Deal era. Levitt and Snyder (1995) analyse the spending patterns of Federal programmes on a congressional district level and nd that the Democratic majorities in the late 1970s have 2 favoured districts with higher Democratic vote shares. Hodler and Raschky (2014) look at regions and show that in autocratic regimes, birthregions of political leaders benet more from foreign aid than others. In this paper, I use cities as a middle ground between individual outcomes and larger units of aggregation.
My paper adds to the existing literature by analysing whether cities with higher vote shares for the German National Socialists in 1933 experienced higher levels of public investments between then and 1939.
Since data on public investment is not readily available, I use public employment as a proxy. While I control for city xed eects and time-varying eects of several control variables, the National Socialist vote share is still a potentially endogenous varibale: Several previous studies (most recently King et al 2008) have highlighted the importance of the post-1929 economic crisis for the NSDAP's electoral results. Dierential impacts of the economic crisis would likely lead to dierences in public employment and also be correlated with the 1933 Nazi vote share. In order to address this concern, I employ a standard two-stage least squares estimation. As instrumental variable, I use the vote share of the Economic Association in 1912, a party alliance that tried to attract similar voters as the NSDAP later on. I nd that cities with higher NSDAP vote shares indeed had higher levels of public employment in 1939; for every additional percentage point in the vote share, the number of public employment jobs increased by around 3.5 percent. When measured relative to the total population, a one standard-deviation increase in the 1933 vote share led to an increase in the share of public employment of a quarter of a standard deviation. The ndings are robust to in-or excluding cities that underwent substantial changes in their population and territory during the period of observation and using the 1930 or 1932 elections instead of the 1933 one as explanatory variable. Taken all together, my ndings indicate a signicant positive eect of having voted for the National Socialists for cities, thus prodiving evidence that the Nazis did indeed use economic policy and public investments to reward more loyal cities or punish disloyal ones. In a broader context, this is further evidence that governments can have and use the ability to reward their voters or punish their adversaries, although some caveats to the reprensentativity of Nazi Germany apply.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the historical background of 1 In September 1930, the National Socialists gained 18.3% of all votes, a share that they managed to even double two years later, when they came ouf of the July 1932 election with 37.4%, making them the strongest fraction in the Reichstag. They and the Communists held more than half of all seats in the Reichstag, rendering it impossible to form a coalition of democratic parties with a parliamentary majority. As a result, the chancellors had to rely more and more on the authority and legislative powers of the president via so-called emergency decrees. After the demise of 3 chancellors (Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher) within half a year, the associates of president Hindenburg managed to convince him to appoint Hitler to head the government, which happened on January However, Hindenburg soon dissolved the Reichstag, and in the elections that followed in March, the NSDAP won 43.9% of the votes. Together with its coalition partner, the national conservative German National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP), the National Socialists now also had a majority in the parliament. Subsequently, the Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz ) was passed, giving legislative powers to the executive branch of the government. In the following months, Hitler used these powers to put the German states under the rule of centrally appointed Commissars (a process commonly known as coordination or Gleichschaltung), forbid trade unions and pressure all other parties until they dissolved. By July 1933, the NSDAP was the only remaining party in Germany and with the death of president Hindenburg in 1934, the last remaining non-Nazi source of power died, and Hitler and his party had now control over every aspect of government. (Kershaw 1999, ch. 10-12) 2.2 Economic policy in the years prior to the war An extensive literature has analysed the reasons for the NSDAP's rapid electoral successes, which socioeconomic groups were more likely to vote for the National Socialists and why they did so (see, among others, While some disagreement about certain issues still exists, there is a clear consensus that the economic crisis that aected Germany in the early 1930's was a prime driver of National Socialist vote shares. As economic conditions worsened, the voters became increasingly dissatised with the democratic parties: The moderate forces in Weimar Germany seemed to be unable to deliver solutions, and as a consequence, voters turned to more extreme alternatives like the communists and, more and more, the Nazis. Not surprisingly, then, economic policy was an important item on the agenda of the newly-appointed chancellor Hitler. Already in May 1932, the NSDAP had demanded an intermediate economic programme (Wirtschaftliches Sofortprogramm) in order to address the unemployment issue. In particular, the party advocated to increase employment through large public investments that were, at least in parts, supposed to be nanced through debt. (Barkai 1988, p. 42) This idea of decit-spending was hardly new: Previous governments such as the one led by Heinrich Brünning annual growth rate of the economy during the same time period amounted to 9.5% and was to a large extent driven by public investment, which grew on average by 18.7%. (Barkai, 1988, chapter 3B) In the beginning, these funds did not yet go into rearmament; a large part of them was used for infrastructrure improvements. Until December 1934, 235 million Reichsmark were used for the improvement and construction of roads, while renovations and improvements of ats were subisidised with 1 billion Reichsmark. (Schiller 1936 ) Robinson (1973) quotes a popular joke in Germany according to which Hitler was planning to give employment in straightening the Crooked Lake, painting the Black Forest white and putting linoleum in the Polish Corridor. In later years, rearmament became the key goal of Nazi economic policy. As Abelshauser (1998) has pointed out, rearmament had been on Hitler's agenda since early on and infrastructure spending had been so prominent in the rst year of his government only for a lack of competing military projects. 4 Taken together, the clearly discriminating purpose of this law and the anecdotal evidence above suggests that the Nazis, once in power, might have used public spending to reward cities and regions that had been loyal to them and to punish those that had been reluctant until the very last. If this were the case, one would expect to nd an increase in public employment for cities with high NSDAP vote shares.
However, it should be noted that a priori, it is also conceivable that public spending could be particularly 3 Empirical Strategy
Data and Summary Statistics
In order to evaluate whether the Nazis allocated more public funds to cities with high Nazi vote shares, I rst need data on the allocation of public funds and investments. While the annually published statistical handbook of German cities (Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte) contains data about the tax revenue of cities, these are to a large extent driven by a city's local economy and hence beyond the powers of the central government. Similarly, for a small subset of cities, data on publicly-subsidised newly-built ats are available, but usually in a sense where publicly-subsidised encompasses both national and local subsidies. 5 In what follows, I will use the log of the number of public administration jobs (denoted logadmin) as outcome variable, but since the German cities experienced considerable population growth between 1925 and 1939, I also examine the ratio of public administration jobs to total population (adminpop) and the ratio of public administration jobs to the labour force (adminshare). Obviously, neither measure is perfect, but since most of the job categories are under the direct control of the central government (e.g. the number of ocers and non-commissioned ocers in the armed forces), it should still be able to draw conclusions from my ndings. Data about this measure of public employment is avaiblable for nearly 300 cities; In particular, it is available for all cities with more than 20.000 inhabitants and for some few smaller 4 See Waldinger (2010 , 2012 for some economic consequences of such dismissals. 5 It might seem odd to include artists and people working in the entertainment industry; the reason for doing it is that the ones that happened to be independent cities, not belonging to any other administrative district (Kreisfreie Städte). In addition, I use voting data from the 1912 Reichstag election, for which I have city-level data for all cities that had more than 10000 inhabitants in 1910. These were obtained from the ocial election results, published by the Statistisches Reichsamt in 1913. All in all, I end up with a sample of 220 cities for 3 years (1925, 1933 and 1939) . Table 1 shows summary statistics of the explanatory and explained variables. As can be seen, both the number and shares of public employees increased from 1925 to 1933 and then decreased again. Given the large amount of public investment and the substantial increase of the German armed forces between 1933 and 1939, this might seem surprising. The most likely explanation is that public employment was driven up between 1925 and 1933 by general employment measures, since it was already used as a means of ghting unemployment before the Nazis came to power. Hence, the decline in public employment between 1933 and 1939 should not be seen as evidence for a decline in more persistent public spending and investment; as shown in section 2.2, these were substantial and grew a lot between 1933 and 1939. However, this pattern of a strong increase as a reaction to the economic crisis makes it more dicult to uncover the causal eect of the NSDAP vote share using a standard OLS approach, since it might create additional biases, as I will discuss in the following section.
Based on the summary statistics of the 1933 vote shares, my sample is quite representative of the national average: The average national vote share of the NSDAP in 1933 was 43.9%, while in my sample, it is 42.1%.
Using the panel structure of my dataset allows me to control for unobserved time-invariant city xed eects.
If, conditional on those, the NSDAP vote share in 1933 is an exogenous variable, I can run the following xed-eects regression:
where y it represents the outcome, i.e. either logadmin, adminshare or adminpop. share33 i denotes the NSDAP vote share in the 1933 election in city i and P ost1933 t is a dummy which is 1 for the year 1939.
6 For Berlin, the data in the database are on the level of the city's administrative districts. I created an aggregated measure for Berlin by adding all districts and boroughs belonging to it. In order to assess the validity of this aggregation, I compared the aggregated population to the one from the censuses in 1925 and 1933. Some dierences exist, but they are well below 5%. 
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The city xed eects c i will account for time-invariant city characteristics that have a constant eect on the public employment share over time. In a way, this set-up is very similar to a standard Dierence-inDierences approach, with the NSDAP share being the treatment variable (that happens to be a continuous variable in this case), the years 1925 and 1933 constituting the pre-treatment period and 1939 being the post-treatment period.
8 A positive estimate for β would mean that cities with a higher vote share for the NSDAP in the 1933 election had higher public employment shares in 1939 compared to cities with a lower vote share, which would be evidence for the new government rewarding its voters. A negative estimate, on the other hand, could be evidence that public employment is used in order to generate more support in originally Nazi-adverse regions.
If one is concerned that some important time-invariant characteristics might have dierent eects before and after the Nazis took power, one can include these controls and interact them with the P ost1933 dummy: 
The Economic Association and its voters
If, conditional on these controls and time-invariant xed-eects, the NSDAP vote share in 1933 is an exogenous variable, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, then the regression specied above will give me a consistent estimate of the causal eect of the vote share on the share of public sector jobs after 1933. However, this is unlikely to be the case. While I include several control variables and interact them with time dummies to allow for dierent eects before and after the Nazi seizure of power, it is very likely that there are other important factors that are either not time-invariant and hence not captured by the xed eect or are timeinvariant but have dierent eects in 1939 than before but are not included in the above specication and are correlated with the vote share in 1933. For example, cities that were more adversely aected by the economic crisis might have been dierentially prone to vote for the NSDAP in 1933 and they might also be those with dierent public employment shares later on. The basic economic structure of a city might lead to such a pattern, but also its history and culture. In all these cases, the NSDAP vote share would be correlated with the error term, and as a consequence, the estimate of β in the above regression will be inconsistent. Another 
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One problem with the regressions in columns 1-3 of table 2 is that the 1933 occupational census was administered in May 1933, when the Nazis had already been in power for three and a half months. Thus, the 1933 numbers might already be partly aected by the Nazi rise to power, an issue I will also discuss for the main specication in section 4.3 below. To alleviate this concern, table 3 just runs a cross-sectional regression for 1925, relating the three public employment oucomes to the 1912 EA vote share. As can be seen, again there is no signicant relationship, a result that is robust to the in-or exclusion of controls. 
Empirical Implementation
If the EA's 1912 vote share is a valid instrument for the NSDAP vote share in 1933, then a standard two-stage approach will produce consistent estimates. In the rst stage, the interaction term between the 1933 NSDAP vote share and time in equation 3.2 will be regressed on an analogous interaction term based on the 1912 EA vote shares, a dummy for being after 1933, a set of city xed eects and interacted control variables:
In the second stage, this predicted interaction term will be used in a regression like in equation 3.2, replacing the vote share interaction by its predicted value from equation 3.3: Table 5 presents the results of simple OLS estimations of equation 3.2. In all four columns, β is estimated to be negative, but typically not very sizable and not signicantly dierent from zero. Taken at face value, this would mean that a city's NSDAP vote share in 1933 had no or a slightly negative eect on the city's public employment share in 1939. This could mean that if anything, instead of favouring loyal cities, the new government tried to buy support from more resistant cities, for example in an attempt to stabilise its power in the early days of the regime. However, these estimates are only consistent if the NSDAP vote share in 1933 is an exogenous variable in equations 3.1 and 3.2. As discussed in section 3.2, this is not very likely. If cities that were aected more by the crisis were less likely to vote for the NSDAP in 1933 (for example since more aected cities were more industrialised and therefore more strongly connected to the communist parties), and public employment increased in these cities as a response to the crisis, the resulting OLS estimate could be downward biased. A similar negative bias could arise if public servants were more likely to vote for the NSDAP and cities with more public employment experienced slower growth in public employment (for example since they were less aected by the crisis and thus did not need large-scale investment programmes, or at least only smaller ones). On the other hand, if cities that were aected more by the crisis turned towards the Nazis, it is easily conceivable that an upward bias might arise.
OLS estimates
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Because of this, the OLS results should be viewed with caution and I next turn to the instrumental variable (IV) estimates discussed in section 3.2.
IV estimates
The 2SLS estimates based on using the 1912 vote share for the Economic Association as instrumental shows that this increase is also robust to ignoring population and labour force movements-in absolute terms, an increase in the 1933 NSDAP vote share of one percentage point would increase the number of public sector jobs by around 3.5%, a quite substantial increase. Taken all together, the results from 6 show that high 1933 NSDAP vote shares lead to a subsequent increase in public sector jobs, both in absolute numbers and in ratios of the population. This pattern thus would not be consistent with the Nazi government buying support from opposing cities, but rather rewarding its strongholds via public employment. Table 7 provides further evidence that the estimates in table 6 are based on government discrimination, rather than other economic forces at work. Here, I repeat the analysis above, but this time using the metal industry, a sector that contracted during the 1929 crisis and expanded during the pre-war buildup, but is not under direct government control, so I would not expect to nd an eect here. This is also borne out by the estimates, which are an order of magnitude smaller than before and not signicantly dierent from zero.
Robustness
This section addresses several potential concerns with the ndings from the IV regressions. As explained in Section 3.1, there were several mergers and restructurings of cities between 1925 and 1933. I tried to exclude all cities whose population growth was mostly driven by territorial enlargement. Still, a certain arbitrary element remains-when are territorial change so important that a city is not anymore comparable over time?
In The results of this study thereby also shed additional light on the ability of governments to use economic policy as a means to reward and protect their voters and supporters and/or to punish their political adversaries.
Thereby, it adds to a vast literature that has documented such behaviour on a rm-level and, to a certain extent, also for individuals. Of course, some cautionary remarks apply. In particular, Germany's Nazi government had powers uncomparable to any modern democratic government. Being freed of the constraints usually posed by a parliamentary opposition, judicial review by courts and a free press, it seems reasonable to assume that the National Socialists' ability to reward a city's loyalty was substantially larger than in most countries at most times. In addition, several questions remain: Through which mechanisms did the government allocate funds to its preferred cities, which where the channels through which the funds went to Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
